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Tactical Problems and Solutions
Armor Quality
As has already been discussed, Japanese armored vehicles were very
lightly constructed, by Western standards. This was, primarily, a result of
Japanese experiences in Manchuria and tropical theatres of war, both of
which had shown heavy vehicles to be a severe liability. Indeed, the
deployment of heavier armored vehicles such as the Sherman and
Matilda II in the Pacific had shown that this experience was not unique to
the Japanese, and many of these heavier vehicles were simply useless
until properly adapted. A great many heavy vehicles were lost, even after
these adaptations, to the machinations of weather, terrain, and clever
infantrymen experienced in taking advantage of the weaknesses of such
vehicles in such circumstances.
The armor protection of Japan's heaviest vehicle to see combat during the
second world war, the Type 1 Chi-He, was approximately 8-50mm thick,
with a welded hull. This was superior to the protection of the M3/M5 Stuart
(the most commonly deployed Allied vehicle in the Pacific). The 50mm
front turret glacis, however, was nearly 49mm thinner than that of the M4
Sherman with which it had been designed to contend, with armor varying
from about 13 to 89mm thick. The most commonly encountered Japanese
medium tank, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, was by comparison only 8-25mm thick,
considerably less effective than the 10-44mm thick armor of the M3/M5
Stuart. The armor of the Type 95 Ha-Go light tank, Japan's most common
vehicle, was nowhere near either vehicle in terms of protection.
The myth that the armor of most Japanese vehicles could be penetrated by
the American .50 MG is just that, a myth, but the protection of Japanese
vehicles in the field was clearly inferior to that of their Allied opponents.
Doctrine
A major problem for Japanese armor in the field was the doctrine with
which it was employed. To the Japanese military establishment, tanks
were strictly supporting weapons, designed to assist the infantry but
generally insufficient in an independent role for anything beyond
reconnaissance. Further, because they were viewed as a subordinate
branch, Japanese tankers were frequently treated as support troops, and
as a result, their views and opinions gained from experience in the field
against Allied armor were generally taken for granted.
As a result of all these factors, Japanese tankers suffered terribly.
Frequently, they would be employed in penny packets with the infantry;
other times, they would be employed in static defense, effectively negating
their chief advantages over Allied vehicles - speed and mechanical
reliability in difficult terrain. Independent operations were generally
discouraged, and when they did take place such actions were executed
under extremely controlled conditions in which the tankers were frequently
thrown against insanely difficult objectives.
In at least one instance, a column of Japanese armor was ordered to
break-through an American position on Tarawa. The Japanese had
scouted the American position thoroughly, knew where the American weak
spots could be found, and had determined that a tank assault could break
the line in a critical place. They had also, however, discovered that the
Americans had two 57mm Anti-Tank guns, pre-sited in the position. The
commander of the Japanese armor formation believed that a frontal attack
against such a position would be unwise, and suggested a flanking
maneuver. The request was ignored, and the order was given for a frontal
assault. Of some thirteen vehicles, only two managed to break through the
American line, and these were quickly overwhelmed.
In another instance, a Japanese tank commander was censured and
recalled home for encouraging his men to make flanking attacks on
American armor positions, having discovered that his vehicles had a much
higher rate of success attacking the Allies from this position.
There were a few genuinely successful Japanese tank actions. Most of
these took place in small armor skirmishes which are frequently recorded
in only the most minimalist of ways - we know, for example, that of the
more than ninety-five American vehicles destroyed on Okinawa, at least
some were destroyed by Japanese tanks. But we do not know how, when,
or under what circumstances.
Japanese "Bushido" Mentality
Japanese infantry may have been successful in part because of the
samurai discipline enforced by their officers, but this was not the case for
Japanese armor. Generally speaking, such attitudes could be absolutely
disastrous for Japanese armored units in the field.
In New Guinea , we are told of a 'Banzai' charge attempted by a unit of IJA
infantry against a strong Australian position. The attack was supported by
Japanese armor, but not in the way that perhaps planners had hoped.
Instead, the Japanese tank crews screamed in triumph, threw open their
hatches, and dismounted to Banzai charge on foot
Improvised Solutions
We know very little about the improvised solutions employed by Japanese
tank crews in these circumstances. To be honest, Allied intelligence
reports are more concerned with killing Japanese armor than with the
ways it which can be better protected, and the memoirs of Japanese
tankers are extremely hard to come by.
At least one methodology to improve the survivability of Japanese armor in
the field was to dig a vehicle in to the earth and use it as a bunker or in a
more or less static hull down position. This did improve survivability
somewhat, but mobility was of course out of the question.
There is also some photographic evidence of Japanese vehicles
camouflaged heavily with foliage and palm trunks. But, this seems to be
an anti-air measure rather than an attempt (as some have alleged) at
cellulose armor. Certainly, because the Allies did not make use of
magnetic anti-tank mines to the same extent as their Japanese
opponents, the use of wood plating of any kind would not have been as
useful a solution for armor protection as it was for the allies.
I have read some claims that the Japanese used sandbags to improve
their survivability. This is certainly possible, but I have looked at hundreds
of photos of Japanese armor in the field, before, during, and after combat
and I have yet to see a single image of a Japanese fighting vehicle using
sandbagged armor in the field. I have, in fact, seen photographs of
Japanese tanks used as bunkers and protected with a layer of sandbags,
but I have never seen them equipped as such in a mobile role. In use
against the Chinese, who were quite fond of the use of Molotov cocktails
as anti-tank weapons, this seems to be an excellent solution, but there is
no evidence (to my knowledge) of such a thing ever being attempted. I
therefore find this probability somewhat unlikely.
We know of at least one tactic that worked for the Japanese, and that was
outmaneuvering the enemy for a flank shot, with the use of superior
speed and mobility of most Japanese vehicles to make this possible.
Certainly, the Australians lost a few Matildas this way, and the Americans
more than a few Shermans. Of course, such behavior was not normally
approved, and as has already been discussed, some Japanese tankers
were actually censured for doing so. By 1944 however, when Japan’s tank
doctrine began to be radically changed, such behaviors seem to have
been accepted practice.
SENSHAN - Japanese Armored Vehicles of the Second World War
