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A Bit of Background
In 1916, Japan began to evaluate the possibility of using armored
vehicles in its armed forces. Observers on the Western Front reported the
great success in the use of these vehicles by Japan's British allies, and a
considerable amount of interest was shown in the Japanese Army for the
possibility of use in Japan's further operations. By the end of the Great
War, Japan had acquired a fair number of French FT-17 and British Mark
V tanks.
Because the Japanese did not yet have the industrial experience
necessary to design their own tanks, very few uniquely Japanese designs
were initially attempted, and on the contrary the FT-17 and Mark V tanks
employed in Japan were stripped of their component parts, studied, and
copied, much in the same way that Japan had acquired a great deal of its
modern arsenal throughout the twentieth century. This greatly increased
expertise in the production of such vehicles.
Before long, the Japanese began to build their own, unlicensed copies of
these vehicles, modified as necessary for the particular needs of service
in Asia. The FT-17, in particular, saw widespread use in Japanese
service, and was modified for use in every capacity from stretcher carrier
to flame thrower tank. Elements of the FT-17 and the Mark V continued to
appear for some time afterward in Japanese tank designs.
In 1923, Major Tomio Hara designed a unique bell-crank and scissors
type suspension which became the standard system for Japan's new
generation of armored vehicles. From that point, the Japanese greatly
expanded their interest in armored vehicle production, so that some 1700
vehicles were in service by 1938 - a fairly impressive accomplishment for
a nation with no experience of building its own armored vehicles prior to
the 1930s. As a point of comparison, during the same period, it has been
estimated that only two hundred of the four thousand automobiles built in
Japan between 1930 and 1939 were built by native Japanese firms.
By 1938, Japan had the world's fourth largest tank force, just behind
France. Of course, Japanese tanks were always built to a different
standard than those of their Western competitors. The Japanese had
experimented in the mid nineteen thirties with a series of heavy, thickly
armored, multi-turreted tanks in Manchuria. The results had been that
most of these vehicles were too slow to keep up with the rapid advance of
Japan's "infantry blitzkrieg" tactics, and too fragile to be used in the difficult
terrain typical of the region. They were completely worthless in coastal
areas, where, owing to their weight to ground pressure ratio, they simply
bogged down in soft soil. Many Japanese officers considered the tank to
be cost ineffective as a result of these experiments.
As a result, Japanese tanks were largely constructed with the idea of
mobility and speed as opposed to protection or heavy slugging power.
This was quite adequate when used in an infantry support role, even
superior when used for recce, and dynamically successful in areas
where heavier tanks simply could not operate. The light armor of these
tanks was constantly upgraded in order to sufficiently defend against their
most lethal opponents - Chinese machine guns. No great need was
seen for the sacrifice of mobility in exchange for protection against the
scarcely seen Chinese anti-tank units, and so, the matter was settled and
became an entrenched part of Japanese tank strategem - even after
experience against the Soviets had shown that this was, perhaps, not the
correct approach.
The Japanese Army simply failed to accept that the tank could be a battle
winner. With an infantry heavy force and very little in the way of any
significant cavalry tradition, the Japanese saw little need for a shock
force. All of the weapons employed by the Japanese ground forces were
designed and intended as support assets for the infantry, and the
concept of an armored breakthrough was complete anathema to the
Japanese military mindset.
In 1941, after extensive experimentation and observation with both Allied
and Axis forces, and partly at the urging of the Emperor himself, the
Imperial General Staff determined that a larger tank force would need to
be developed. As such, tank production was stepped up, and 1942
witnessed the single largest production run of armored vehicles by the
Japanese in a single year, some 1,290 vehicles. Thereafter, however,
production sharply declined again, priorities being given to aircraft and
warships. In 1944, the IJA grudgingly conceded that heavier vehicles
would be needed to defend against the increasingly successful Allied
counter-offensives in the Pacific, and a new doctrine was envisioned.
Japanese tankers travelled to Europe and studied with German armor
schools, and in at least one instance a Japanese tank crew served in a
Tiger during a combat operation. Heavy designs were stepped up and
increasingly scarce metal reserves were set aside for new production of
armored vehicles.
By then, of course, it was probably a matter of too little, too late...
Japanese Tank Production By Year
1939 345
1940 735
1941 1,190
1942 1,290
1943 780
1944 295
1945 130
Total: 4,765
+ca 1,700 >1939 models
In 1916, Japan began to evaluate the possibility of using armored
vehicles in its armed forces. Observers on the Western Front reported the
great success in the use of these vehicles by Japan's British allies, and a
considerable amount of interest was shown in the Japanese Army for the
possibility of use in Japan's further operations. By the end of the Great
War, Japan had acquired a fair number of French FT-17 and British Mark
V tanks.
Because the Japanese did not yet have the industrial experience
necessary to design their own tanks, very few uniquely Japanese designs
were initially attempted, and on the contrary the FT-17 and Mark V tanks
employed in Japan were stripped of their component parts, studied, and
copied, much in the same way that Japan had acquired a great deal of its
modern arsenal throughout the twentieth century. This greatly increased
expertise in the production of such vehicles.
Before long, the Japanese began to build their own, unlicensed copies of
these vehicles, modified as necessary for the particular needs of service
in Asia. The FT-17, in particular, saw widespread use in Japanese
service, and was modified for use in every capacity from stretcher carrier
to flame thrower tank. Elements of the FT-17 and the Mark V continued to
appear for some time afterward in Japanese tank designs.
In 1923, Major Tomio Hara designed a unique bell-crank and scissors
type suspension which became the standard system for Japan's new
generation of armored vehicles. From that point, the Japanese greatly
expanded their interest in armored vehicle production, so that some 1700
vehicles were in service by 1938 - a fairly impressive accomplishment for
a nation with no experience of building its own armored vehicles prior to
the 1930s. As a point of comparison, during the same period, it has been
estimated that only two hundred of the four thousand automobiles built in
Japan between 1930 and 1939 were built by native Japanese firms.
By 1938, Japan had the world's fourth largest tank force, just behind
France. Of course, Japanese tanks were always built to a different
standard than those of their Western competitors. The Japanese had
experimented in the mid nineteen thirties with a series of heavy, thickly
armored, multi-turreted tanks in Manchuria. The results had been that
most of these vehicles were too slow to keep up with the rapid advance of
Japan's "infantry blitzkrieg" tactics, and too fragile to be used in the difficult
terrain typical of the region. They were completely worthless in coastal
areas, where, owing to their weight to ground pressure ratio, they simply
bogged down in soft soil. Many Japanese officers considered the tank to
be cost ineffective as a result of these experiments.
As a result, Japanese tanks were largely constructed with the idea of
mobility and speed as opposed to protection or heavy slugging power.
This was quite adequate when used in an infantry support role, even
superior when used for recce, and dynamically successful in areas
where heavier tanks simply could not operate. The light armor of these
tanks was constantly upgraded in order to sufficiently defend against their
most lethal opponents - Chinese machine guns. No great need was
seen for the sacrifice of mobility in exchange for protection against the
scarcely seen Chinese anti-tank units, and so, the matter was settled and
became an entrenched part of Japanese tank strategem - even after
experience against the Soviets had shown that this was, perhaps, not the
correct approach.
The Japanese Army simply failed to accept that the tank could be a battle
winner. With an infantry heavy force and very little in the way of any
significant cavalry tradition, the Japanese saw little need for a shock
force. All of the weapons employed by the Japanese ground forces were
designed and intended as support assets for the infantry, and the
concept of an armored breakthrough was complete anathema to the
Japanese military mindset.
In 1941, after extensive experimentation and observation with both Allied
and Axis forces, and partly at the urging of the Emperor himself, the
Imperial General Staff determined that a larger tank force would need to
be developed. As such, tank production was stepped up, and 1942
witnessed the single largest production run of armored vehicles by the
Japanese in a single year, some 1,290 vehicles. Thereafter, however,
production sharply declined again, priorities being given to aircraft and
warships. In 1944, the IJA grudgingly conceded that heavier vehicles
would be needed to defend against the increasingly successful Allied
counter-offensives in the Pacific, and a new doctrine was envisioned.
Japanese tankers travelled to Europe and studied with German armor
schools, and in at least one instance a Japanese tank crew served in a
Tiger during a combat operation. Heavy designs were stepped up and
increasingly scarce metal reserves were set aside for new production of
armored vehicles.
By then, of course, it was probably a matter of too little, too late...
Japanese Tank Production By Year
1939 345
1940 735
1941 1,190
1942 1,290
1943 780
1944 295
1945 130
Total: 4,765
+ca 1,700 >1939 models
Another Honved.com "Mini-Site"
SENSHAN - Japanese Armored Vehicles of the Second World War
